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We examine the tradeoffs of CFO accounting expertise and their role in firm-manager 
matching decisions. Although prior work examines the positive effects of accounting 
expertise on several financial reporting outcomes, there is little evidence on the tradeoffs this 
expertise entails, much less how firms compensate for these tradeoffs. We conjecture that 
acquiring accounting expertise requires costly tradeoffs in terms of acquiring other skills, 
including operational knowledge and strategic expertise. We find that these tradeoffs are 
reflected in firms’ hiring decisions ex ante and affect several ex post employment decisions. 
Collectively, the results suggest accounting expertise is a carefully weighed attribute of CFO 
hires that shapes and is shaped by the composition of the top management team.  
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1.  Introduction 
In contrast to standard agency models, a growing body of evidence suggests that the 
characteristics of corporate executives matter for firm policies and outcomes (e.g., Bertrand 
and Schoar 2003; Ge et al. 2011; Hoitash et al. 2016). In this vein, the accounting literature 
provides evidence that hiring an accounting expert CFO can improve financial reporting 
outcomes (e.g., Li et al. 2010). However, there is relatively little evidence on other factors 
that might affect the decision to hire an accounting expert CFO. For example, while CFO 
accounting expertise can provide certain benefits to the firm, developing this expertise 
generally requires the manager to forego experiences that would build expertise in other areas 
that are often within the scope of the CFO’s responsibilities, such as managing the investor 
relations function and overseeing business development activity. Thus, this expertise also 
plausibly entails tradeoffs that could weigh on the firm’s hiring decisions not only for the 
CFO, but also for other executives.  
We provide evidence on the tradeoffs of CFO accounting expertise by examining 
firms’ CFO employment decisions and other decisions about the structure and composition of 
the top management team. The basis of our approach is that boards are cognizant of a 
manager’s skill set and take potential tradeoffs into consideration when making employment 
decisions. While boards’ assessments about managers’ skill sets could be incorrect on 
occasion, such incorrect assessments are unlikely to be pervasive or persist over the long-
term (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Thus, if accounting expertise involves significant tradeoffs 
to firms, we expect these tradeoffs to affect a number of firm-manager matching decisions. 
For example, if accounting expert CFOs lack the expertise to perform more operational 
functions, hiring an accounting expert CFO could influence other employment decisions at 
the firm (e.g., the composition of the top management team). Therefore, we use analyses of 
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ex ante matching between the firm and the manager as well as several ex post tests to 
triangulate evidence.  
Our analysis is based on a sample of over 8,000 CFO hiring events at U.S. public 
firms with employment hire dates between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2013 as 
reported on BoardEx. We proxy for a CFO’s accounting expertise by identifying those CFOs 
with a CPA designation (hereafter “CPA CFOs”) on the basis that this proxy is easy to 
identify in a large sample and is an objective measure of accounting expertise. Although the 
definition likely excludes some accounting expert CFOs who do not hold a CPA license, it is 
unlikely to include CFOs who are not accounting experts, because the education and 
experience requirements necessary to become a CPA are extensive.  
We begin by providing evidence that CPA CFOs trade off educational and career 
experiences to develop accounting expertise. The CFO role is multi-faceted and has evolved 
to include many operational, strategic, and general management responsibilities, so 
experiences that prepare the manager for these responsibilities are likely to be valuable. We 
find that, relative to non-CPA CFOs, CPA CFOs 1) are less likely to have a MBA, 2) are less 
likely to have prior finance experience, 3) have fewer years of their employment history 
working in a U.S. public company, and 4) are less likely to sit on the board of a public 
company. These findings suggest that acquiring accounting expertise requires a tradeoff in 
terms of acquiring other skills and knowledge that are plausibly valuable for CFOs of public 
companies.  
To provide evidence on the significance of the tradeoffs to accounting expertise, we 
first model the firm’s decision to hire a CPA CFO. Following the literature on fit/refit theory 
(e.g., Chen and Hambrick 2012), we assume that boards attempt to match their firms’ needs 
with the appropriate CFO. Thus, we expect that firms with greater demand for accounting 
expertise will be more likely to hire an accounting expert CFO. In contrast, to the extent that 
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accounting expert CFOs lack expertise in other areas and boards recognize this tradeoff, 
firms with greater demand for non-accounting expertise in the CFO position (e.g., business 
development or investor relations expertise) will be less likely to hire an accounting expert 
CFO. If manager characteristics do not matter to firm outcomes or the tradeoffs in their 
backgrounds are not perceived to be significant, we would observe no relation between the 
relative demand for accounting and non-accounting expertise and the expertise of the 
managers hired. Similarly, if the executive labor market is sufficiently illiquid to prevent 
efficient matching between firms and managers, we also would not observe any relation 
between firm needs and manager characteristics.1 
Consistent with the systematic matching of firm and manager characteristics, we find 
that CPA CFOs are more likely to be hired at firms for which we posit that the relative 
demand for accounting expertise is higher. Specifically, firms are more likely to hire a CPA 
CFO when accounting in the industry is more complex and accounting regulatory 
requirements are more demanding. However, we expect that CPA CFOs are less effective at 
developing and implementing firm strategies, managing communications with the capital 
markets (i.e., investor relations), and managing complex operations. These functions are 
increasingly under the purview of the CFO but likely require different skill sets than those the 
average CPA CFO might possess. Consistent with this, we find that firms are less likely to 
hire a CPA CFO when they compete more on product differentiation, have more geographic 
segments, are in financial distress, make greater investments in capital and research and 
development, or when analyst following is higher.  
We also examine how the composition of the firm’s existing top management team 
influences firm-manager matching. If the tradeoffs of CFO accounting expertise are non-
                                                            
1 Furthermore, if we are unable to effectively capture a firm’s demand for accounting and non-accounting 
expertise, we should observe no relation between firm characteristics and the type of CFO hired. We explore 
this possibility further in robustness tests discussed in Section 4.6. 
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trivial, then the presence of other executives on the top management team with potentially 
complementary skills and job responsibilities could affect the firm’s CFO hiring decision. We 
find that firms with a top manager holding an accounting related job title are less likely to 
hire a CPA CFO. Similarly, we find that firms with a Chief Operating Officer (COO) are 
more likely to hire a CPA CFO. To the extent a COO position reduces the breadth of a CFO’s 
job responsibilities, the tradeoffs associated with hiring a CPA CFO are less pronounced for 
firms with existing COO positions.   
The tradeoffs inherent in accounting expertise are also likely to affect subsequent 
employment decisions at the firm. First, as firms change over time, the relative importance of 
the tradeoffs of CFO accounting expertise should also change. Thus, a CFO’s tenure with the 
firm depends on the evolution of the firm’s product market, regulatory environment, financial 
characteristics, management team, and other factors. Factors that shift the firm toward 
demanding greater financial reporting skills improve the fit of accounting expert CFOs, 
whereas factors that shift the firm toward demanding greater operational, strategic, or general 
management expertise reduce the fit of accounting expert CFOs. Because there are 
transaction costs associated with replacing a manager, firms are unlikely to replace their CFO 
unless the decline in fit is sufficiently large that the benefits of replacement (in terms of fit) 
exceed the costs of replacement. Thus, we examine whether significant declines in firm-
manager fit are associated with CFO turnover—i.e., whether firm-manager mismatching is 
associated with CFO turnover. To proxy for firm-manager fit, we use our model of the 
determinants of hiring a CPA CFO (hereafter “hiring model”) to generate predicted values of 
the CPA variable for every year between the year of hire and each subsequent year of the 
CFO’s tenure. Large negative (positive) changes in predicted values of CPA correspond to a 
substantially worse fit if the hired CFO was a CPA (non-CPA). We find evidence that 
significant declines in firm-CFO fit are associated with CFO turnover. 
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Second, changes in the expertise of the CFO could lead the firm to adjust the 
composition of the top management team. While our prior analysis finds that the composition 
of the top management team at the time of the hiring decision influences whether a firm hires 
an accounting expert CFO, it is also possible that firms change their organizational structure 
ex post to compensate for any major tradeoffs they make when hiring a CFO. Consistent with 
this, we analyze how changes in accounting expertise in the CFO position are associated with 
changes in the presence of an accounting related position or a COO position following a CFO 
appointment. We find evidence that firms establish other top management positions to 
compensate for deficiencies in CFOs’ skill sets. For instance, we find that after an increase in 
CFO accounting expertise, the top management team is significantly more likely to drop a top 
accounting related position than add such a position.    
Third, an important consideration for firms when hiring a CFO is whether the 
manager possesses the option value to eventually progress to the CEO position. Prior 
research provides evidence that there are distinct advantages to hiring a CEO internally (Shen 
and Canella 2002). Because CFOs are included in the set of possible internal hires, hiring a 
CFO with the requisite skill sets needed in the CEO position plausibly benefits the firm 
(Zhang and Rajagopalan 2003). CPA CFOs are less likely to possess these requisite skills 
because the CEO position requires greater non-accounting related expertise and less 
accounting related expertise. Thus, CPA CFOs could have lower option value to progress to 
the CEO position, which would represent an important tradeoff of CFO accounting expertise. 
Consistent with this idea, we find that CPA CFOs are less likely to be promoted to the CEO 
position in the five years following their CFO appointment relative to non-CPA CFOs.  
Our study provides several important insights. While prior papers examine several 
firm outcomes associated with CFO accounting expertise (Aier et al. 2005; Li et al. 2010; 
Hoitash et al. 2016), there is relatively little evidence on the significance of the tradeoffs 
6 
associated with this expertise for firms’ CFO hiring decisions or other critical employment 
decisions. In contrast to prior work, we take the perspective that boards typically recognize 
tradeoffs inherent in hiring an accounting expert CFO and match firms’ needs to the 
appropriate CFO. Consistent with this perspective, we find that accounting expert CFOs are 
more likely to match to firms with greater demand for accounting expertise but less likely to 
match to firms with greater demand for operational expertise or general management 
experience. 2  We also find that the structure of the top management team (namely, the 
presence of high-level accounting or operational positions) affects these CFO hiring decisions. 
The tradeoffs of CFO accounting expertise appear to affect firms’ subsequent employment 
decisions as well. Changes in firms’ needs—and therefore, firm-manager fit—are an 
important factor in subsequent turnover decisions. Further, we find evidence that the 
expertise of the CFO affects subsequent organizational structure decisions, including CEO 
hiring decisions and decisions about other high-level positions.  
Collectively, the evidence suggests that accounting expertise is a carefully weighed 
attribute of the top management team. Boards appear to be aware of the tradeoffs associated 
with accounting expertise and make a number of organizational design decisions to avoid 
significant negative firm outcomes that might arise from a poor firm-manager fit. These 
findings are informative to boards and managers and speak to the broader literature that 
associates manager characteristics with high-level firm outcomes. In particular, our evidence 
suggests that identifying the effects of specific manager characteristics on firm outcomes is 
potentially complicated by firms’ actions to mitigate the tradeoffs of those characteristics.  
                                                            
2 These results may help to explain CFO hiring trends over time. As discussed further below, we observe a 
general decline in CPAs being hired as CFOs since the mid-2000s—a period of time that has seen the role of the 
CFO expand to include more general management and operational responsibilities. We also observe that firms 
in financial distress are less likely to hire CPA CFOs, which is consistent with the decline in the hiring of CPA 
CFOs during the financial crisis. 
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2.  Motivation and empirical predictions 
In addition to their responsibility over traditional financial reporting and treasury 
functions, CFOs also increasingly oversee a variety of other firm activities (Favaro 2001; 
Groysberg et al. 2011; Consero 2013). For example, although setting the strategic vision of 
the organization is largely the purview of the CEO, the CFO is expected to provide insight 
and analysis to support the CEO’s strategic planning.3 This analysis might involve guiding 
merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions, developing business partnerships or alliances, and 
evaluating potential expansion plans. CFOs are also involved in communications with 
external stakeholders, playing a prominent role in building and maintaining relationships with 
the investment community and media (Favaro 2001).4 Further, CFOs are increasingly given 
more general management responsibilities, such as oversight over the information technology 
(IT), property, and logistic functions of the organization (Ernst & Young 2010). It is plausible 
that CFOs with different skill sets have differing levels of success in managing these 
extensive responsibilities.  
Consistent with the existence of benefits to accounting expertise, several prior studies 
find that accounting expert CFOs more effectively manage the accounting related 
responsibilities of their position, such as monitoring financial reporting and internal control 
functions (e.g., Aier et al. 2005; Li et al. 2010). For example, Li et al. (2010) show that firms 
are more likely to hire a CFO with accounting expertise after disclosing ineffective internal 
controls, and such hiring increases the likelihood of remediating internal control deficiencies. 
In addition, DeFond et al. (2005) find that the stock market reacts positively to hiring an 
                                                            
3 For example, in a recent survey of Fortune 1000 CFOs, 81% indicated that their companies viewed the finance 
function as a “strategic business partner” (Consero 2013). In another survey of CFOs, 75% indicated that they 
spend 50% or more of their time on strategic aspects of their role (Ernst & Young 2010).  
4 The role of CFOs in investor relations is apparent given their prominent role in corporate conference calls—Li 
et al. (2014) find that comments by the CFO make up 33% of the text spoken in their sample of conference calls 
(relative to the 47% of text spoken by the CEO). In addition, based on a 2012 survey of 736 investor relations 
executives, the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) reports that 65% of investor relations managers 
report to the CFO at their company.  
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accounting expert to an audit committee but not to hiring a non-accounting financial expert, 
suggesting that accounting expertise is value-enhancing in certain circumstances.  
We expect that investments made to develop accounting expertise lead managers to 
tradeoff educational and work experience in roles that build expertise important to executing 
non-accounting functions of the CFO. Prior research provides some evidence consistent with 
this tradeoff. For example, in their sample of CFOs, Ge et al. (2011) report a negative 
correlation between having a CPA and having an MBA. Having a more general educational 
background (such as an MBA) or work experience as the head of a business unit or 
geographic segment could provide the CFO with the familiarity and expertise necessary to 
help manage operational responsibilities (e.g., product sourcing). Similarly, backgrounds in 
investment banking, equity research, or asset management can be valuable to a firm because 
serving investor constituencies requires extensive knowledge of them—the information they 
demand and the incentives they face. Likewise, the need to contribute to strategic plans 
requires expertise that can accrue from positions in corporate business development, M&A 
structuring at investment banks, or private equity.5 The investments necessary to acquire 
accounting expertise plausibly come at the expense of these experiences.  
We expect the tradeoffs inherent in developing accounting expertise affect CFO 
hiring decisions and several ex post employment decisions at the firm. However, the 
significance of these tradeoffs is ultimately an empirical question. Even if accounting expert 
CFOs lack experience in operational capacities, investment banking, etc., they are likely to be 
supported by staff who do have many of these non-accounting experiences. Further, an 
accounting expert CFO likely develops skills important to managing non-accounting 
functions while working in accounting positions—for example, the ability to manage staff 
                                                            
5 Brochet and Welch (2011) find that CFOs with “transaction experience” (e.g., experience in investment 
banking, private equity, venture capital, and management consulting) report goodwill that is more value-relevant, 
consistent with this type of experience resulting in higher quality valuations in an acquisition.  
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and client relationships as a partner at a public accounting firm. These factors could, at least 
in part, mitigate the costs to the firm of hiring an accounting expert CFO.  
Our main hypothesis, in alternative form, is as follows:  
H1: Accounting expertise entails trading off other forms of expertise that firms consider 
valuable in the CFO position. 
We develop four specific predictions based on this hypothesis. If managers’ skill sets 
are important to fulfill the range of CFO job responsibilities, then a key function of boards is 
to “match” the needs of the firm with the appropriate CFO. This matching of managerial 
skills with the needs of the firm is the focus of the literature on fit/refit theory (e.g., 
Finkelstein et al. 2009; Chen and Hambrick 2012). For example, Chen and Hambrick (2012) 
argue that the extent to which a new CEO benefits a firm depends upon the degree to which 
she fits the firm’s situation relative to the previous CEO. However, certain frictions can 
undermine efficient firm-manager matching. For example, it is possible that the executive 
labor market is relatively illiquid, which would restrict efficient matching between firms and 
managers. If such constraints are sufficiently binding, then systematic matching between 
firms and managers may not occur. Similarly, systematic matching may not occur if there is 
substantial uncertainty about firm needs or potential managers’ abilities.  
If efficient matching does occur, at least on average, a firm’s hiring decision should 
reflect tradeoffs associated with the manager’s skill set. In particular, the probability of hiring 
an accounting expert CFO should be increasing in the firm’s demand for accounting expertise 
and decreasing in the firm’s demand for non-accounting expertise. For example, firms that 
operate in industries with higher levels of accounting complexity should be more likely to 
hire accounting expert CFOs, whereas firms that have greater demand for strategic expertise 
(e.g., those that make more acquisitions) should be less likely to hire accounting expert CFOs. 
Thus, we put forth the following prediction with respect to firms’ hiring decisions:  
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P1:  Firms are more (less) likely to hire accounting expert CFOs when there is greater 
demand for accounting (non-accounting) expertise in the CFO position. 
We expect boards match the needs of the firm with the appropriate CFO at the time of 
hire. However, as the needs of the firm change over time, the expertise of the existing CFO 
may become a poor fit. For example, a non-accounting expert CFO may be considered a poor 
fit subsequent to the discovery of material weaknesses in internal controls. Just as we expect 
boards hire a CFO that matches the needs of the firm, we also expect boards recognize when 
the CFO does not meet the firm’s changing needs and replace the CFO when the costs of 
doing so are lower than the costs associated with a poor firm-manager fit. Thus, to 
complement our prediction of the ex ante matching of firms and managers, we also examine 
whether changes in the demand for accounting and non-accounting expertise influence ex 
post CFO employment decisions (i.e., turnover). In particular, we expect that CFO turnover is 
more likely to occur when the characteristics of the firm change such that the relative demand 
for accounting and non-accounting expertise is significantly different from the time of the 
initial CFO appointment. Thus, our next prediction relates to the likelihood of CFO turnover: 
P2: The likelihood of CFO turnover is higher when there is a significant decline in the firm-
manager fit since the initial appointment. 
Firm-level decisions are a joint effort by the top management team (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984), and boards can compensate for weaknesses in the skill sets of CFOs by shifting 
job responsibilities to other members of the top management team. If CFO accounting 
expertise entails trading off other expertise, it is plausible that CFO hiring decisions would 
also affect ex post hiring decisions of other executives. In other words, the tradeoffs in CFO 
accounting expertise could influence the composition of the top management team.  
To explore this possibility, we consider the implications of changes in CFO accounting 
expertise for boards’ subsequent decisions to establish senior accounting or operational 
positions. We expect changes in CFO accounting expertise to be associated with changes in 
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the structure of the top management team. For instance, after hiring a non-accounting expert 
CFO to replace an accounting expert CFO, the board can hire a Chief Accounting Officer to 
compensate for the loss in CFO accounting expertise. Similarly, if the newly hired CFO is an 
accounting expert while the departing CFO does not have accounting expertise, the board can 
hire a COO to compensate for the lack of operational expertise. Thus, we state the following 
prediction regarding the composition of the top management team: 
P3a:  Increases (decreases) in CFO accounting expertise are associated with the addition 
(deletion) of a COO position in the top management team. 
P3b:  Increases (decreases) in CFO accounting expertise are associated with the deletion 
(addition) of an accounting related position in the top management team. 
Another important factor boards are likely to consider when hiring a CFO is the 
manager’s option value to advance to the CEO position. There are distinct benefits to 
promoting an internal candidate to the CEO position, as internal candidates have a deeper 
understanding of firms’ internal operations and are generally easier for boards to evaluate 
than external candidates.6 Indeed, prior research shows that appointing an external CEO is 
associated with lower future firm operating performance (Shen and Cannella 2002), 
suggesting higher costs to appointing an external CEO relative to an internal CEO. 
 Prior research also shows that the likelihood of appointing an internal candidate to 
the CEO position is increasing in the supply of internal candidates (Zhang and Rajagopalan 
2003). We expect that because the CEO position requires more non-accounting related 
expertise, accounting expert CFOs are less likely to possess the skill sets to be CEO. As a 
result, hiring an accounting expert CFO reduces the pool of internal candidates from which to 
choose the new CEO. Therefore, we next examine whether accounting expertise reduces the 
                                                            
6 The board often appoints an “heir apparent” so the heir can develop the skills and knowledge necessary to be 
an effective CEO and the board can assess the heir’s development before the CEO’s departure (Zhang and 
Rajagopalan 2003).   
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option value associated with a CFO appointment. Specifically, we state the following 
prediction with respect to the likelihood of CFO promotion to the CEO position: 
P4:  The likelihood of promotion from the CFO position to the CEO position is lower for 
accounting expert CFOs relative to non-accounting expert CFOs.  
Collectively, our predictions examine whether the tradeoffs of accounting expertise 
are substantial enough to influence both the ex ante matching of firms and CFOs and ex post 
employment decisions at the firm. Findings consistent with these predictions (P1-P4) would 
lend support to our main hypothesis (H1). 
3. Data and sample selection 
Our primary source of information on CFOs is BoardEx, an international data 
provider that uses public disclosures to track executives’ educational and employment 
backgrounds. We use the BoardEx employment file to select a sample of CFO hires at 
publicly traded U.S. companies with employment hire dates between January 1, 2000 and 
December 31, 2013.7 We identify CFOs by searching for job titles that include the term 
“CFO” or “Chief Financial Officer” but do not include the terms “Division”, “Region”, “Co-
CFO”, “Deputy CFO”, or “CEO.” We also remove firm-years in which the firm has multiple 
CFO hires in the same year. Finally, we require that each executive in the sample remains 
employed by the company in the CFO position for a full fiscal year after the hire date 
(hereafter the “year after hire”). We impose these restrictions to ensure the sample consists of 
corporate-level CFOs who were neither subordinate to other executives in the finance 
function nor serving on an interim basis.  
                                                            
7 For approximately 24% of our sample, BoardEx specifies the date of hire at a month-year or year level, not at 
the daily level. For these observations, we assume that the executive was hired at the end of the period for which 
the hire date is defined. For example, if BoardEx lists the hire date as October 2003, we assume a hire date of 
October 31, 2003, and if the hire date is listed as 2003, we assume that the hire date is December 31, 2003. 
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As discussed previously, we proxy for accounting expertise by identifying CFOs with 
a CPA designation (CPA CFOs). 8  Prior literature has also used experience at public 
accounting firms to capture accounting expertise (e.g., Li et al. 2010). We choose to measure 
accounting expertise using the CPA designation to ensure we do not miss accounting-based 
experience at non-Big 4 firms as well as to avoid classifying managers with experience in 
non-accounting related functions at the Big 4 firms (e.g., consulting) as having accounting 
expertise. In addition, given the heterogeneous nature of job titles and responsibilities across 
organizations, identifying accounting expertise based on prior work experience is likely to 
introduce more noise into our proxy. 
Table 1, Panel A summarizes the sample selection procedure. In addition to the 
sample selection criteria discussed above, we require observations to have data on total assets 
in Compustat (in the year after hire). Our selection criteria yield a final sample of 8,497 CFO 
hire observations. 9  Due to limited availability of data for control variables and certain 
dependent variables, however, the number of observations is generally lower in our tests.10  
In Panel B of Table 1, we present an overview of our sample composition over the 
sample period. Our sample consists of an average of 606 CFO hires per year. On average, 
49.6 percent of CFOs hold a CPA. The proportion of these newly hired CFOs holding a CPA 
increased gradually from 42.7 percent to 54.8 percent from 2000 until 2006, after which the 
proportion of CFOs hired with a CPA declined to 46.9 percent in 2013 (see also Figure 2).  
                                                            
8 Although specific licensing requirements vary by state, most states require a four-year bachelor degree in 
business or accounting and 150 credit hours, passing the four-part Uniform CPA Exam, and at least one year of 
relevant work experience supervised by a verified CPA or equivalent. 
9 We use hiring event data rather than firm-manager-year panel data because the firm’s needs are unlikely to 
remain constant over the entire length of the manager’s tenure with the firm. Assuming there is some adjustment 
cost associated with executive turnover, turnover initiated by the firm would only occur once the cost of a poor 
fit is greater than the adjustment cost. Thus, a hiring model should reflect closer matching of firm and manager 
than a panel model. In Section 4.3, we explore the possibility that a poor fit leads to executive turnover.  
10 Specifically, in addition to financial data from Compustat, the calculation of some variables requires returns 
data from CRSP, M&A deal information from Thomson SDC Platinum, analyst coverage from I/B/E/S, internal 
control and restatement data from Audit Analytics, compensation data from Execucomp, and other executive 
related information from BoardEx. We discuss measurement of these variables further in Section 4.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 CFO characteristics and background 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of CFO characteristics for our sample of CFO 
hires and the variables used in our main tests, which we define in Appendix A. We present 
these statistics for the full sample (Panel A) and then separately for CPA CFO hires and non-
CPA CFO hires (Panel B). Of the CFOs in our sample, 38% have an MBA degree (MBA), 
10% have finance backgrounds (FIN), defined as experience in an investment bank or 
holding a CFA designation, and 34% have prior experience as a CFO at a U.S. public 
company (PriorCFO).11 In addition, the average proportion of the CFO’s prior years of 
experience (as listed on BoardEx) at a U.S. public company is 34% (Prop Public US Exp); 
16% of the CFOs held a board seat of a public company at the hire date (Board Seat at Hire 
Date); and approximately 60% were hired externally (ExtHire). The average age (Age) of 
CFOs in our sample is 48, and for CFOs that turnover during our sample period, the average 
tenure (Tenure) is 4 years.  
We provide evidence of potentially important tradeoffs in the backgrounds and skill 
sets of CFOs in Panel B of Table 2 and Table 3. Panel B of Table 2 shows that, as expected, 
CPA CFOs are significantly less likely to have an MBA degree or prior finance experience 
(p-value < 0.01). For example, 47% of non-CPA CFOs hold an MBA degree versus only 
29% for CPA CFOs. The proportion of the CFO’s prior years of experience (as listed on 
BoardEx) that was spent at a U.S. public company is significantly less for CPA CFOs than 
non-CPA CFOs. We also find that CPA CFOs are less likely to hold a board seat at a public 
                                                            
11 We determine whether a CFO has experience in investment banking based on whether the CFO has been 
employed by an investment bank using a list compiled with data from Thomson SDC Platinum. Specifically, for 
each year from 1962 (the earliest year of data availability on SDC) through 2008, we obtain the names of the top 
50 investment banks ranked by mergers and acquisitions, debt issuance, or equity issuance fees. We then match 
by hand the investment bank names obtained from this step to those listed in the BoardEx employment file to 
capture all variations of the investment bank names (including subsidiary names) listed in BoardEx. The final 
list includes 2,165 separate investment bank names.  
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company than non-CPA CFOs at the time of hire (p-value < 0.01), consistent with the notion 
that CPA CFOs often lack the general operational and management expertise that is desirable 
for a board position. In contrast, Table 3 shows that CFOs with an MBA degree typically 
have more general management and finance experience, as illustrated by the significantly 
positive correlations between MBA and finance experience, prior U.S. public company, and 
board experience. Overall, the evidence suggests that although CPA CFOs are likely to 
possess greater financial reporting expertise, this expertise is typically at the expense of 
finance and general operational and managerial experience.12  
4.2 Determinants of hiring a CPA CFO (P1) 
We test our first prediction (P1) by examining the determinants of hiring a CPA CFO 
using the following logistic regression model where CPA is equal to one if the newly hired 
CFO has received a CPA (or international equivalent) and zero otherwise:  
ܲݎሺܥܲܣ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܱܵܺ௧ ൅ ߛଶܫ݊݀ܥ݋݉݌݈݁ݔ݅ݐݕ௧ିଷ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଷ|ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ିଵ| ൅
ߛସܫܥ ௧ܹିଵ ൅ ߛହܯܣ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ଺ܫ݊݀ܯܣ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ଻ܩݎ݋ݏݏܯܽݎ݃݅݊௧ିଵ ൅ߛ଼ܫ݊݀ܩݎ݋ݏݏܯܽݎ݃݅݊௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଽܩ݁݋ܵ݁݃௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܦ݅ݏݐݎ݁ݏݏ௧ିଵ ൅ߛଵଵܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵଶܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐܨ݋݈݈݋ݓ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵଷܣܿܿݐ݃௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵସܥܧܱܥܲܣ௧ିଵ ൅ߛଵହܥܱܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵ଺ܴܱܣ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵ଻ܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵ଼ܮ݁ݒ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵଽܮ݊ሺܯܸܧሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ  (1) 
Equation (1) includes four variables that capture time-series and cross-sectional 
variation in the demand for accounting expertise at the firm- and industry-level. Appendix A 
provides exact variable definitions. We expect that the incentive to hire a CPA CFO is stronger 
during the initial adoption years of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), as firms were required to 
comply with the new internal control disclosure requirements under Section 404 that became 
effective in 2004. To examine this effect, we include an indicator variable equal to one for 
                                                            
12 Table 3 also reveals expected associations between other executive characteristics and background variables. 
For instance, CFO age is positively correlated with prior CFO experience, the likelihood of holding a board seat 
at a public company at the time of hire, and being an external hire at the sample firm.  
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CFO hires that occurred between 2004 and 2006, and zero otherwise (ܱܵܺ).13 We measure 
industry-level accounting complexity using the average number of restatements unrelated to 
fraud in the firm’s industry group in the three years prior to the CFO hire year 
(IndComplexity).14 Industries with complex accounting practices are likely to experience more 
restatements on average (Peterson 2012). We use the absolute level of accruals scaled by total 
assets (|Accruals|) as a firm-specific measure of accounting complexity, as accruals often 
require substantial judgment and estimation by managers. Finally, we include a measure of 
internal control quality using an indicator variable for whether the firm disclosed an internal 
control weakness in the fiscal year prior to the hire year (ICW). We expect that the probability 
of hiring a CPA CFO is increasing in these four variables (i.e.,	ߛଵ	through ߛସ ൐ 0).  
We include eight variables to proxy for demand for non-accounting expertise. To 
capture the firm’s demand for high-quality strategic decision-making, we use M&A activity 
and gross margin, a measure of product differentiation. Mergers and acquisitions are an 
important mechanism through which firms implement their strategic direction (e.g., Hoberg 
and Phillips 2010). We take the natural log of one plus the number of acquisitions a firm 
makes in the year prior to the CFO’s hire date to capture M&A activity (MA). We also 
include the variable IndMA, calculated as the natural log of one plus the total number of 
acquisitions of an industry in the year prior to the CFO’s hire date, to capture any demand for 
strategic decision-making arising from M&A activity at the industry-level (e.g., due to M&A 
waves). Greater reliance on product differentiation requires greater strategy-related expertise 
in developing business partnerships and creating effective marketing strategies. We use a 
firm’s gross margin in the year prior to the CFO’s hire year to proxy for the firm’s strategy 
type (e.g., cost leader versus product differentiator) (GrossMargin). These strategies likely 
                                                            
13 Results are robust to alternative definitions for the time period of the SOX variable – specifically, 2003-2006 
and 2003-2007. 
14 We use three-digit SIC codes to define industry groups when calculating industry-level independent variables. 
Results are robust to using two-digit SIC groups or Fama-French 12 industry classifications. 
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vary significantly across industries; thus we also include the industry median gross margin 
(IndGrossMargin).  
We use analyst following (AnalystFollow) to proxy for a firm’s demand for investor 
relations expertise. Firms with higher analyst following likely invest greater resources in 
managing communications with the capital markets, and thus likely require a CFO with 
greater expertise in investor relations. Additionally, we use three measures to capture firms’ 
demand for general management experience: number of geographic segments (GeoSeg), 
likelihood of financial distress (Distress), and total investment (Investment). General business 
experience is likely necessary to effectively manage functions such as IT and logistics across 
geographically dispersed operations. Similarly, firms that are in financial distress likely 
require general management experience to navigate the significant business changes that are 
required to turn around a company.15 We also consider the overall level of investment in 
capital expenditures and research and development, as these investment decisions require 
strategic and operational evaluation prior to implementation. These variables are all 
increasing in the demand for non-accounting expertise, so we expect their coefficients to be 
negative (i.e., ߛହ through ߛଵଶ ൏ 0).  
We also examine whether a firm’s CFO hiring decision is a function of several 
characteristics of the top management team. Many job responsibilities of the CFO likely 
overlap with those of other top-level executives. It is plausible then that the composition of 
the top management team can affect the decision of who to hire (i.e., which managerial skill 
sets are important in the hiring decision). First, we examine the possibility that the presence 
of a high-level accounting position such as Chief Accounting Officer makes it less likely that 
the CFO has to be actively involved in the accounting functions at the firm. We include two 
                                                            
15 Consistent with this conjecture, Custodio et al. (2013) find that firms in financial distress pay more for 
“generalist” CEOs, suggesting that general management experience is more desirable when firms are in 
financial distress. 
18 
variables to capture the level of accounting expertise at the firm at the time of the CFO’s hire: 
Acctg, which equals one if BoardEx indicates the employment of an individual with a job 
description including the words “Accounting” or “Controller” (e.g., Chief Accounting 
Officer, Principal Accounting Officer) at the firm as of the hire date of the CFO, and zero 
otherwise; and CEOCPA, which equals one if the CEO as of the CFO’s hire date has a CPA 
and zero otherwise. Second, we examine whether the presence of a COO influences the 
decision to hire a CPA CFO; COO is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a COO 
(or equivalent) at the time of hire. We expect that when a firm has a COO to manage non-
accounting responsibilities, the scope of the CFO’s responsibilities is likely to be more 
focused on financial reporting and related activities; therefore, firms with COOs will be more 
likely to hire CFOs with accounting expertise, all else equal. 
Finally, we include several variables to control for firm characteristics that potentially 
influence the hiring decision: return on assets (ROA) to control for performance, book-to-
market ratio (BM) to control for growth prospects, leverage (Lev) to control for financial 
structure, and the natural log of market value of equity (Ln(MVE)) to control for firm size. An 
overview of the timing of variable measurement is illustrated in Figure 1 and descriptive 
statistics of our determinants variables are reported in Table 2.16 
Panel A of Table 4 provides the coefficient estimates of several variants of Equation 
(1). Panel B presents the average marginal effects. Columns (1) and (2) present results for 
specifications including only the variables that capture firms’ demand for accounting and 
non-accounting expertise, respectively. We combine these specifications in Column (3) and 
add the three variables related to the compensating effects of other top management team 
                                                            
16 We do not control for the CPA status of the prior CFO, as doing so could control away the predicted effects if 
firm and industry characteristics are stable over time. Similarly, we do not control for characteristics of the CFO 
(e.g., MBA status) because  our thesis is that acquiring accounting expertise comes at the cost of developing 
more general, non-accounting expertise. Thus, controlling for elements of this tradeoff would plausibly control 
away the effects we predict.  
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members’ backgrounds in Column (4). Finally, we present the results of our full 
specification, including the controls for firm characteristics, in Column (5). 
Column (1) shows that all the coefficients on the variables that capture firms’ demand 
for accounting expertise are significantly positive, with the exception of the coefficient on 
|Accruals|.17 Column (2) shows that the coefficients on five of the eight variables that capture 
firms’ demand for non-accounting expertise in the CFO position are significantly negative. 
Firms are less likely to hire CPA CFOs when there is greater demand for strategy expertise 
(GrossMargin), investor relation activities (AnalystFollow), and general management 
experience (GeoSeg, Distress, Investment). The results remain similar in Column (3) and 
Column (4). Once we include controls for other firm characteristics in Column (5), the 
coefficient on IndGrossMargin becomes significantly negative; however, the coefficients on 
ICW and AnalystFollow become insignificant. The latter result is likely due to the high 
correlation between analyst following and firm size; firms with large market capitalization 
generally have a greater need to cultivate relationships with Wall Street.18 Overall, the results 
in Table 4 are consistent with P1; firms are significantly more likely to hire CPA CFOs when 
the demand for accounting expertise in the executive team is high and less likely to hire CPA 
CFOs when other, non-accounting related expertise is more important.19  
                                                            
17  While the coefficient on |Accruals| is not significant, further investigation reveals that there are some 
observations with extreme values of |Accruals| even after winsorizing the variable at the 1% and 99% level. 
These extreme observations are generally correlated with extreme negative operating performance (e.g., large 
restructuring charges). When we separately control for these extreme observations, the coefficient on |Accruals| 
is significantly positive, consistent with firms with more complex accounting hiring CPA CFOs. 
18 In particular, when we exclude firm size from the model in Column (5), the coefficient on AnalystFollow is 
significantly negative with a t-statistic of -4.76 (p-value < 0.01). 
19 We interpret firms’ hiring outcomes as a reflection of their demand for specific CFO expertise; however, it is 
possible that managers select into firms with particular characteristics. To the extent these preferences for 
certain types of firms are related to the manager’s skill set—i.e., they chose to work for firms at which they 
expect to perform best—our interpretation of the results would continue to hold. However, if managers’ 
preferences are unrelated to their skill set and are correlated with our variables of interest, we could be 
attributing our results to the matching of firms’ needs with managers’ skills when, in fact, it is due to some 
unidentified managerial preference. One such potential preference might stem from risk aversion (e.g., Hoitash 
et al. 2016). For example, if CPA CFOs are generally more risk averse than non CPA CFOs, they might have 
stronger preferences to avoid working for distressed firms. Thus, the fact that distressed firms are less likely to 
hire CPA CFOs might be due to CPA CFOs’ preferences rather than the firm’s demand for general management 
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The coefficients on the variables related to the management team are also broadly 
consistent with our expectations. We find that the presence of an accounting-focused position 
on the management team lowers the probability of hiring a CPA CFO and that the existence 
of a COO position increases the probability of hiring a CPA CFO. Interestingly, however, the 
presence of a CEO with a CPA increases the probability of hiring a CPA CFO. Although this 
result is contrary to the notion that firms hire accounting expert CFOs when they lack this 
expertise in their top management team, to the extent the CEO plays a role in hiring the CFO, 
the positive association is consistent with social psychology research that suggests biases 
toward demographically similar individuals (Westphal and Zajac 1995). It is also possible 
that the existence of a CPA CEO captures other, less observable reasons accounting expertise 
is important on the top management team. Finally, we find that larger firms and firms with 
fewer growth opportunities (i.e., higher book-to-market ratio) are significantly less likely to 
hire CPA CFOs.  
The average marginal effects reported in Panel B of Table 4 suggest the findings are 
economically significant. For example, firms are 3.3% more likely to hire a CPA CFO during 
the initial SOX implementation years and 14.8% less likely to hire a CPA CFO when they are 
in financial distress (Column (5)). These effects are considerable given that the average 
likelihood of hiring a CPA CFO is 49.6%. To gauge the joint significance of the variables 
measuring the demand for non-accounting expertise, we calculate the difference between the 
probability of hiring a CPA when these variables are high versus low. High (low) 
corresponds to the 75th (25th) percentiles of the distributions for continuous variables and 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
experience. However, we note that risk aversion could provide only a partial alternative interpretation of our 
results given that many of the firm characteristics associated with hiring a CPA CFO have little apparent 
relation to firm risk. Moreover, we examine whether CPA CFOs, relative to non CPA CFOs, have a larger 
proportion of their total compensation that is fixed (under the assumption that risk averse managers would 
demand greater fixed compensation). We find no evidence that this is the case. While we cannot definitively 
rule out the possibility that managerial preferences (unrelated to managers skill sets) influences our results, we 
do not find strong evidence that risk aversion, in particular, is driving our results nor can we think of another 
obvious managerial preference that would differ systematically between CPA CFOs and non CPA CFOs.       
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(0) for indicator variables. We keep the variables measuring the demand for accounting 
expertise, the firm controls, and the CEOCPA, COO, and Acctg variables at their mean 
values. The difference in these probabilities is approximately 23% (for the specification in 
Column (5) of Table 4). We calculate the joint significance of the variables measuring the 
demand for accounting expertise using a similar procedure and find a difference in the 
probability of hiring a CPA when these variables are high versus low of 13%.20 
Taken together, the results suggest that CPA CFOs are valued for their accounting 
expertise and companies respond to demand for financial reporting expertise by hiring CPAs 
as CFOs. However, the tradeoffs associated with developing accounting expertise also appear 
to be significant enough to influence firms’ hiring decisions; firms tend to appoint non-CPA 
CFOs if there is a greater demand for operational or general management skills. Boards also 
appear to consider complementarities in the management team when they make hiring 
decisions. 
4.3 CFO turnover (P2) 
To the extent that our hiring model is reasonably descriptive of the firm-manager 
matching process, we expect a higher probability of CFO turnover when the factors that 
explain the firm-manager match change significantly. Thus, to examine P2, we use our hiring 
model to identify situations where there has been a significant decline in the fit of the CFO at 
the firm since the initial appointment. Specifically, we first calculate the predicted probability 
of hiring a CPA CFO using Equation (1) for the year of hire and each subsequent firm-year 
until the CFO’s departure (PredCPAt+n, where t is the hire year). We then calculate 
                                                            
20 These percentages are similar for the specification in Column (4) of Table 4 (i.e., excluding the control 
variables). The differences in probabilities, however, are somewhat lower if variables that are statistically 
insignificant in Column (5) of Table 4 are instead held at their mean values (specifically, 21% and 8% for the 
variables measuring non-accounting expertise and accounting expertise, respectively). Also, because this 
calculation is based on differences in the probability of hiring a CPA when all the proxies for a type of demand 
are high versus low, the combined effect is predicted for hypothetical firms. Nonetheless, these percentages 
highlight the joint economic significance of our determinants variables. 
22 
∆CPA_Fitt+n, which equals the predicted value in each year subsequent to the date of hire less 
the predicted value at the hire date (∆CPA_Fitt+n = PredCPAt+n - PredCPAt). Higher (lower) 
values represent situations where the needs of the firm change toward (away from) needing a 
CPA CFO. Put differently, if the firm has a non-CPA CFO, a high value of ∆CPA_Fitt+n 
would suggest a decline in fit, whereas, if the firm has a CPA CFO, a low value of 
∆CPA_Fitt+n would suggest a decline in fit. Thus, we define a PoorFitt+n indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm has a CPA CFO (non-CPA CFO) and ∆CPA_Fitt+n is in the bottom 
(top) quintile of the distribution. We then estimate the probability the CFO leaves the firm in 
a given year (CFO_Exitt+n+1) using the following logistic regression:21 
ܲݎሺܥܨܱ_ܧݔ݅ݐ௧ା௡ାଵ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܲ݋݋ݎܨ݅ݐ௧ା௡ ൅ ߛଶܴ݁ݐ௧ା௡ ൅ ߛଷܤ݋ܽݎ݀ܵ݁ܽݐ௧ ൅ߛସܥܧܱܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௧ ൅ ߛହܣ݃݁௧ା௡ ൅ ߛ଺ܲݎ݅݋ݎܥܨܱ௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܮ݊ሺܯܸܧ௧ା௡ሻ ൅ ߛ଼ܮ݁ݒ௧ା௡ ൅ߛଽܤܯ௧ା௡ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܴܱܣ௧ା௡ ൅ ߶௝ ൅ ߰௡ ൅ ݁௧ା௡ାଵ      (2) 
 
We include a number of control variables that are likely to affect the propensity of a 
CFO exit, including lagged returns, CEO tenure, CFO age, and measures of a CFO’s ability 
(prior CFO experience and board experience) (Mian 2001). Further, we include CFO tenure 
fixed effects to control for the propensity for CFOs to turnover at similar points in their 
tenure as well as industry fixed effects. We estimate Equation (2) separately for non-CPA 
CFOs and CPA CFOs because the effects of the controls on turnover are plausibly different 
between CPA and non-CPA CFOs.         
 Results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report results 
for the non-CPA CFO and CPA CFO subsample, respectively. We find a positive coefficient 
on the PoorFitt+n indicator variable in Column (1), suggesting that non-CPA CFOs are more 
likely to leave the firm when the firm’s demand for accounting expertise increases (consistent 
with P2). We find similar evidence in Column (2) for the sample of CPA CFOs, indicating 
                                                            
21 Ideally, we would capture only CFO departures that are involuntary in the sense that they are due to a 
mismatch between the CFO’s skills and the needs of the firm. However, identifying the true underlying reasons 
for CFO departures is empirically difficult; very few CFOs are explicitly fired (e.g., Mian 2001).  
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that CPA CFOs are more likely to leave the firm when the firm’s demand for non-accounting 
expertise increases. We continue to find significant positive coefficients on the PoorFitt+n 
indicator when we control for the full set of determinants as shown in Columns (3) and (4).  
Overall, these results suggest that CFOs are more likely to turnover when their skill sets 
become a worse fit for their firm’s current needs. 22        
4.4 Compensating changes in the top management team (P3) 
In this section, we examine the association between changes in CFO accounting 
expertise and subsequent changes in the presence of COO and accounting related positions at 
the firm (P3a and P3b). We classify CFO appointments as either AddCPA, when the CFO 
hired has a CPA and the prior CFO did not, or DropCPA, when the CFO hired does not have 
a CPA and the prior CFO did. Thus, for this analysis we eliminate appointments where the 
prior and current CFO had similar accounting expertise (both CPAs or both non-CPAs) as 
well as hiring events for which we do not have data on the identity of the prior CFO. We also 
remove firms that either have or do not have COO positions both before and after hiring the 
CFO (i.e., firms without changes in the presence of the COO position). We then define 
observations as DropCOO (AddCOO) where the firm had (did not have) a COO in the year 
prior to the CFO’s hire, but does not have (has) a COO by the end of the second calendar 
year after the CFO’s hire. This approach assumes that boards would restructure the top 
management team within two years to adapt to any changes in the skill sets of their CFOs. 
We use similar definitions for AddAcctg and DropAcctg and similar sample construction for 
the analysis of the presence of accounting related positions. 
Table 6, Panel A presents a contingency table of the proportion of CFO hires that (1) 
represent the addition (deletion) of a CPA CFO and (2) occur in conjunction with the addition 
                                                            
22 We do not examine the accounting expertise of the CFOs hired as replacements to the CFOs in this turnover 
analysis, because the replacement CFOs are included in the primary sample for our hiring model (Section 4.2). 
Thus, examining whether firms whose characteristics now suggest the need for a CPA CFO (non-CPA CFO) 
subsequently hire such a CFO would be redundant.   
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(deletion) of a COO. The results indicate that when a firm moves from a CPA CFO to a non-
CPA CFO (DropCPA row), it is more likely to drop its COO position (51.6%) versus add a 
COO position (48.4%). In contrast, when a firm moves from a non-CPA CFO to a CPA CFO 
(AddCPA row), it is more likely to add a COO position (53.8%) versus drop its COO position 
(46.2%). A Chi-square test indicates a significant association between the decision to hire an 
accounting expert CFO and subsequent changes to the COO position (2 = 3.071, p < 0.10).  
Table 6, Panel B presents the contingency table for accounting related positions. 
Consistent with the results for COO positions, we find that when a firm moves from a CPA 
CFO to a non-CPA CFO (DropCPA row), it is more likely to add another accounting related 
position to the management team (51.4%) rather than drop such a position (48.6%). The 
reverse is true when a firm moves from a non-CPA CFO to a CPA CFO (AddCPA row): the 
firm is significantly more likely to drop an accounting related position (59.8%) rather than add 
such a position (40.2%) (2 = 10.617, p < 0.01). Overall, these results are consistent with P3, 
reinforcing the idea that firms recognize the tradeoffs in CFO accounting expertise and take 
actions to adapt to changes in the skill sets of CFOs. 
4.5 Progression to the CEO position (P4) 
Our final prediction examines whether hiring a CPA CFO is costly to a firm because 
it reduces the pool of internal candidates from which to select a CEO at a future date. 
Specifically, we examine the probability that, within five years of being hired as CFO, the 
individual becomes the CEO at the same firm where she is currently employed as CFO. 
Because we only have employment data until the end of 2013, we limit this analysis to CFOs 
who were hired between 2000 and 2008. We estimate the following logistic regression 
model: 
ܥܧܱ௧,௧ାହ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܥܲܣ௧ ൅ ߛଶܲݎ݅݋ݎܥܨ ௧ܱ ൅ ߛଷܣ݃݁௧ ൅ ߝ௧   (3) 
25 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating Equation (3), including the corresponding 
average marginal effects. The results suggest that CPA CFOs are significantly less likely than 
non-CPA CFOs to progress to the CEO position, consistent with P4. The average marginal 
effect implies that CPA CFOs are approximately 1.1% less likely to become the CEO within 
five years of being hired as a CFO, which is large in magnitude given that the overall 
likelihood of becoming the CEO is 3.7% (Table 2 Panel A).  
This evidence, combined with our earlier finding that firms are more likely to add a 
COO position following the appointment of an accounting expert CFO (as documented in 
Section 4.4) is related to the literature on CEO succession planning. Prior work suggests 
firms often engage in “relay” succession, in which a CEO “heir apparent” (often the COO) is 
designated prior to the CEO departure (Vancil 1987). For example, Naveen (2006) 
documents that the likelihood of having a high-level operational position increases from 41% 
to 60% from four years prior to CEO turnover to one year prior to CEO turnover. Thus, given 
that CPA CFOs are less likely to be promoted to CEO, it appears that boards establish a COO 
position following the appointment of an accounting expert CFO to establish a viable heir 
apparent. Overall, these results are consistent with our main hypothesis that accounting 
expertise entails costs in terms of a tradeoff with general management skills that would be 
useful for non-accounting related job responsibilities. 
4.6 Robustness analyses  
4.6.1  Observability of demand for accounting and non-accounting expertise 
In our analysis of the determinants of hiring an accounting expert CFO (tests of P1), 
most of our proxies for the demand for accounting and non-accounting related expertise are 
based on firm characteristics in the year prior to hire. One concern with this approach is that 
these firm characteristics might not represent the firm’s needs going forward. Although there 
is evidence from prior literature that, on average, managers are not hired to implement 
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significant changes to firm characteristics or policies (Pan 2017), we acknowledge that in 
some cases this is not true. In these situations managers are still matched to meet the firm’s 
needs; however, these needs are less observable prior to hire, which reduces our ability to 
predict the expertise of the CFOs they hire.23   
To provide evidence that firm characteristics prior to the hiring event generally 
represent the needs of the firm going forward, we separately examine the predictive strength 
of our model based on four proxies for the expected stability of the firm’s operating 
environment. These proxies include the following (see Appendix A for variable definitions): 
1) a significant operational change or event in the first full year of the CFO’s tenure 
(OpChanget+1), based on the assumption the firm anticipates large operational changes; 2) a 
large return shock in the year preceding the CFO’s hire (RetShockt-1), which is more likely to 
be associated with significant subsequent changes at the firm; 3) high return volatility in the 
year preceding the CFO’s hire (RetVolt-1); 4) externally hired CFOs (ExtHire), based on prior 
evidence that firms hiring external candidates are more likely to make changes to the firm 
(Huson et al. 2004). We expect that the four events listed above raise the likelihood that 
characteristics at t – 1 are less representative of the firm’s needs going forward. Thus, for 
each of the four events we divide our sample into two subsamples based on whether the firm 
experienced the event; we then estimate our hiring model separately on the two subsamples. 
We expect that, collectively, the independent variables in our model will be more predictive 
                                                            
23 The fact that we find significant associations between our proxies for the demand for accounting and non-
accounting expertise and CFO expertise suggests that, on average, “hiring for change” is not overwhelmingly 
pervasive in our sample. That is, if the firm’s characteristics at t – 1 are not a good indication of its needs going 
forward, our tests are biased against finding a significant association between these characteristics and the type 
of CFO the firm hires. Evidence that declines in CFO-firm fit (based on significant changes in our proxies) are 
associated with higher CFO turnover also suggests that, on average, firm characteristics at t – 1 are indicative of 
the firm’s needs going forward. 
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of the hiring outcome for the subsample with more stable operating environments (i.e., not 
experiencing the event).24 
 Our test statistic is the difference in the Pseudo R2 between the two subsamples. 
Because the distribution of the test statistic is unknown, we conduct a randomization test to 
generate a null distribution of the difference between the predictive strength of the model 
based on random assignment of each observation (see Appendix B for additional details on 
this procedure). We use this null distribution to test the significance of the difference in the 
Pseudo R2. 
Table 8 presents the results of this analysis. Panel A presents results using our full 
hiring model including control variables (the model reported in Column (5) of Table 4), and 
Panel B reports results excluding the control variables (Column (4) of Table 4). In each case 
across the two panels, the Pseudo R2 from our hiring model is smaller for the subsample 
undergoing a potential change. For example, the Pseudo R2 from the hiring model is 2.2% for 
firm-years classified as having an operating change versus 3.1% for firm-years classified as 
not having an operating change. This difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.03 (i.e., in our randomization procedure, only 3% of the trials resulted in test statistics 
greater than the actual test statistic). This result provides further evidence that the hiring 
model reflects firm-manager matching notwithstanding potential measurement error in the 
independent variables—that is, the model is more predictive when the needs of the firm are 
more stable, and therefore, more observable.  
                                                            
24 We examine differences across the subsamples in terms of the total explanatory power, which reflects the 
combined effect of all the variables, rather than differences in individual coefficients because the motivations to 
“hire to change” likely vary across firms. For instance, one firm may hire an M&A expert CFO when the firm 
anticipates M&A activity after a period of no activity; others may hire to improve the firm’s analyst coverage or 
to improve cost control, etc. As a result, only a fraction of the data is likely to support differences across the 
subsamples on any given coefficient.  
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4.6.2 Demand for non-accounting expertise  
Our inferences with respect to P1 and P2 are valid only to the extent our proxies 
reflect firms’ demand for accounting and non-accounting expertise. To provide further 
validation of our proxies, we consider whether they can be used to predict the hiring of a 
“generalist” CFO. We proxy for general management expertise using MBA because, like CPA, 
it is easily measured in a large sample and MBA CFOs are likely to have relatively diverse 
experiences and skill sets. Thus, we expect that the propensity to hire an MBA CFO is 
increasing (decreasing) in the demand for non-accounting (accounting) expertise. To test this 
idea, we estimate an amended version of Equation (1) by replacing the dependent variable 
CPA with MBA.  
The results of these analyses (untabulated) show that firms are more likely to hire a 
generalist CFO when they follow a product differentiation strategy (i.e., higher gross margin) 
have higher analyst following, more complex operations, or higher levels of investment. 
These results are consistent with the notion that firms prefer to hire a generalist CFO when 
they have a greater demand for general management skills. We also find that firms with 
greater industry-level accounting complexity are less likely to hire MBA CFOs, consistent 
with boards recognizing that generalist CFOs are less likely to have expertise to handle 
complex accounting issues. This evidence increases our confidence that our proxies are 
capturing firms’ needs for accounting related and non-accounting related expertise. However, 
we recognize that because MBA is negatively correlated with CPA (-0.19), this evidence is 
not independent from our earlier analysis of the determinants of hiring a CPA CFO and 
should be interpreted accordingly.   
4.6.3  Measurement of accounting expertise 
Throughout our paper, we define accounting expert CFOs as those individuals who 
have received a CPA (or equivalent) certification. Although we provide evidence that, on 
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average, CPA CFOs have less finance, operational, and general management experience, it is 
likely that some subset of our CPA CFOs also develop non-accounting related expertise 
(through education or work experience). For example, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 
indicate that 29% of our CPA hires also have an MBA. Similarly, it is possible that older 
CPA CFOs develop more non-accounting skills over time. We test the sensitivity of our 
results to this classification decision. Specifically, we re-estimate all of our analyses 
excluding 1) CFOs that have both a CPA and an MBA, and 2) CFOs in the top quartile of 
age. In general, we find inferentially similar results with these adjustments (untabulated), 
although significance levels are lower for certain tests.25  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the tradeoffs of accounting expertise. We first provide evidence 
that acquiring accounting expertise requires a tradeoff in terms of acquiring other skills and 
knowledge (e.g., finance or general management). Consistent with these tradeoffs being 
significant for firms’ CFO hiring decisions, we find that a firm’s propensity to hire a CPA 
CFO, our proxy for an accounting expert, is increasing (decreasing) in the demand for 
accounting expertise (non-accounting expertise) in the CFO position. Analyses of subsequent 
employment decisions further illustrate the significance of the tradeoffs of CFO accounting 
expertise. We show that significant declines in the fit between the CFO and the firm’s needs 
after initial appointment are associated with a higher probability of CFO turnover. We also 
find evidence that changes in CFO accounting expertise at a firm are associated with changes 
in the composition of the top management team, consistent with firms making hiring 
decisions to complement CFOs’ skill sets. Further, we find that CPA CFOs are less likely to 
become CEOs at the same firm in the five years following their CFO appointment, consistent 
                                                            
25 For example, in Table 6, Panel A (change in existence of a COO position), the p-value is 0.17 when dropping 
older CFOs, perhaps because of a large decrease in sample size (from 838 to 494) due to missing ages for some 
observations. The majority of the remaining tests are significant at the 10% level or better.     
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with accounting expert CFOs having a lower option value to potentially advance to the CEO 
position.  
Overall, our results suggest that boards recognize the tradeoffs in CFOs’ skill sets and 
carefully weigh the presence of accounting expertise on the top management team. These 
results have important implications for the literature that examines the effects of manager 
characteristics on firm policies and outcomes. Identifying the effects of specific manager 
characteristics on firm outcomes is complicated by firms’ actions to compensate for 
deficiencies in managers’ skill sets through organizational design choices. That is, because 
the tradeoffs inherent in managers’ characteristics affect the structure and composition of the 
top management team, most firm outcomes are likely to be noisy proxies for the costs and 
benefits of a specific manager’s skill set. Our findings also highlight that efficient matching 
between firms and managers can diminish empirical relations between manager 
characteristics and firm outcomes, which would not necessarily suggest that there are no 
tradeoffs associated with the characteristic.26  
More broadly, our study contributes to the literature on the matching of managers’ 
skills with firms’ needs and highlights potential costs of acquiring accounting expertise. 
These findings are likely to be informative for boards of directors in their hiring decisions 
and managers for their career development.   
                                                            
26 For example, a firm with greater financial reporting complexity might be more likely to have accounting 
restatements but also more likely to hire an accounting expert CFO. Thus, with efficient matching between firms 
and managers, the negative effect of accounting expertise on restatements can be offset in whole or in part by 
the positive effect of reporting complexity on restatements. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Name Definition 
|Accruals| Absolute value of total accruals, scaled by total assets (Compustat items 
(|IBC-OANCF|)/AT) 
∆CPA_Fitt+n Predicted value of Equation (1) in each year subsequent to the CFO’s 
date of hire less the predicted value at the hire date (n = 0), scaled by the 
predicted value at the hire date.
Acctg  Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has an individual other than 
the CFO with the term "Accounting" or “Controller” in the role 
description, and zero otherwise 
AddAcctg Indicator variable equal to one if the firm did not have an accounting 
related position in the year prior to the CFO’s hire but does by the end 
of the second calendar year after the CFO’s hire and zero otherwise 
AddCOO Indicator variable equal to one if the firm did not have a COO in the 
year prior to the CFO’s hire but does by the end of the second calendar 
year after the CFO’s hire and zero otherwise 
AddCPA Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO hired has a CPA and the prior 
CFO did not (where data is available) and zero otherwise 
Age Age of the CFO 
AnalystFollow Natural log of 1+maximum number of estimates used in calculating a 
consensus EPS forecast for the firm at any point during the fiscal year. 
Missing values are set to zero. 
BM Book-to-market (Compustat items CEQ/(CSHO*PRCC_F)) 
BoardSeat  Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO held a board seat at a public 
company at the time they were hired as CFO at the sample firm 
CEOCPA Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has a CPA or Chartered 
Accountant qualification, and zero otherwise 
CEOTenure Tenure of the CEO (in years) at the time the CFO was hired at the 
sample firm 
CEOt,t+5 Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO became CEO of the same 
firm within 5 years of being initially hired as a CFO at the sample firm, 
and zero otherwise 
CFA Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO has a CFA qualification, and 
zero otherwise
CFOExit t+n+1 Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO departs the firm during fiscal 
year t+n+1, where year t is the hire year 
COO Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has an individual other than 
the CFO with the title COO or Vice President of Operations 
CPA Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO has a CPA or Chartered 
Accountant qualification, and zero otherwise 
Distress Indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports negative book value of 
equity (Compustat item CEQ) 
DropAcctg Indicator variable equal to one if the firm had an accounting related 
position in the year prior to the CFO’s hire but did not at the end of the 
second calendar year after the CFO’s hire and zero otherwise 
DropCOO Indicator variable equal to one if the firm had a COO in the year prior to 
the CFO’s hire but did not at the end of the second calendar year after 
the CFO’s hire and zero otherwise 
DropCPA Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO hired does not have a CPA 
and the prior CFO did (where data is available) and zero otherwise 
ExtHire 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO position was the first position 
the individual held at the company, as reported on BoardEx 
FIN Indicator variable equal to one if the executive has prior work 
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experience at an investment banking firm or they hold a CFA 
qualification and zero otherwise 
GeoSeg Log of number of geographic segments at the firm 
GrossMargin Gross margin (Compustat items (SALE-COGS)/SALE) 
IndGrossMargin Median industry gross margin; industry defined at the 3-digit SIC code 
IB Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO has prior experience listed in 
BoardEx from an investment bank, and zero otherwise 
ICW Indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported an internal control 
weakness  
IndComplexity Natural log of 1+average number of non-fraud restatements in the firm’s 
3-digit SIC industry group  
Investment Natural log of 1 + capital expenditures plus research and development, 
scaled by sales (Compustat items (CAPX+XRD)/SALE) 
Lev Leverage, where values greater than 1 are winsorized to 1 (Compustat 
items (DLC+DLTT)/AT) 
MA Natural log of 1+number of acquisitions the firm made in the most 
recent 365 days  
IndMA Natural log of one plus the total number of acquisitions of an industry in 
the most recent 365 days; industry defined at the 3-digit SIC code 
MBA Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO holds an MBA degree, and 
zero otherwise
MVE Market value of equity (Compustat items CSHO*PRCC_F) 
OpChange 
Indicator variable equal to one if any of the following criteria hold: (1) 
special items, discontinued operations, or restructuring charges are 
greater than 5% of sales, (2) the firm experienced a change in their 
industry (either NAICS or SIC), or (3) sales have been “restated 
for/reflects a major merger or reorganization resulting in the formation 
of a new company” (Owens et al. 2016) and zero otherwise 
PoorFit Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO hired at the sample firm is a 
non-CPA (CPA) and ∆CPA_Fit is in the top (bottom) quintile of the 
distribution 
PriorCFO Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO has prior experience as a CFO 
of a public company
Prop Public US Exp 
 
Proportion of prior years of experience listed on BoardEx spent at a US 
public company 
Ret Market adjusted buy and hold annual returns  
RetShock Indicator variable equal to one if the maximum absolute monthly return 
in the year prior to the CFO’s hire is above the mean in our sample and 
zero otherwise 
RetVol Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s stock return volatility in the 
year prior to the CFO’s hire is above the mean in our sample and zero 
otherwise 
ROA Return on assets (Compustat items OIADP/AT) 
SOX Indicator variable equal to one if the CFO was hired between 2004 and 
2006 (inclusive) and zero otherwise 
Tenure Tenure in the CFO position at the sample firm (missing when BoardEx 
indicates the individual was CFO at the firm in 2013) 
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Appendix B: Description of randomization tests to assess differences in predictive 
strength of hiring model 
In Table 8, we report the Pseudo R2 from estimating our hiring model on various subsamples 
of firm-years identified as undergoing significant change versus remaining stable.  To test the 
significance of the difference in Pseudo R2s between the subsamples, we use a randomization 
test similar to that used in Lundholm and Myers (2002) and described further below.   
We first calculate the test statistic, which represents the difference in the Pseudo R2 of 
Equation (1) for each subsample of firms (e.g., for those with OpChanget+1 = 0 and those 
with OpChanget+1 = 1). We then randomly assign firms to each group, ensuring that the 
number of firms in each subsample is held constant with each randomization. For instance, 
within our sample, 4,950 (1,506) observations were used to calculate the Pseudo R2 for the 
OpChanget+1 = 0 (OpChanget+1 = 1) subsamples. Therefore, when calculating the null 
distribution for this subsample grouping variable, we randomly assign 4,950 observations 
from this potential sample of 6,456 observations to the non-operating change subsample and 
1,506 to the operating change subsample. This ensures that the null distribution of the test 
statistic is not affected by differences in the sample size used. Once firms are randomly 
assigned into a subsample, we re-estimate the test statistic. We repeat this random assignment 
and re-estimation 999 times, which gives us a distribution of the test statistic under the null 
hypothesis of no difference in the predictive ability of our model between firms that 
experienced an operating change in year t + 1 and those that did not. The significance level of 
the test statistic is (NGE + 1)/1000, where NGE represents the number of test statistics from 
the null distribution that is at least as large as our calculated test statistic (e.g., 0.009 for 
OpChanget+1).28 
                                                            
28 We perform this procedure numerous times and although the specific p-value changes in each trial due to the 
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Table 1, Panel A: Sample selection 
 Number of 
observations 
CFOs hired from 2000-2013 at publicly traded U.S. companies 
(excluding dual CEO-CFO positions and CFOs that were previously 
employed as CFO at the same firm) 
13,908 
Less: Divisional, regional, deputy, or co-CFOs (660) 
Less: Observations with missing CIK codes on BoardEx (1,527) 
Less: CFOs that were employed for less than a complete fiscal year (1,907) 
Less: Multiple CFOs hired in the same calendar year (34) 
Less: Firm-years with missing assets (1,283) 
Sample of CFO hires 8,497 
Note: Actual sample sizes differ depending on availability of control variables 
 
Table 1, Panel B: Sample distribution 
  
Year CFO hires CPA hires Non-CPA hires 
Proportion of CFO hires 
with a CPA 
2000 647 276 371 0.427 
2001 624 300 324 0.481 
2002 657 321 336 0.489 
2003 636 325 311 0.511 
2004 708 367 341 0.518 
2005 733 372 361 0.508 
2006 732 401 331 0.548 
2007 690 372 318 0.539 
2008 646 317 329 0.491 
2009 444 234 210 0.527 
2010 487 236 251 0.485 
2011 457 214 243 0.468 
2012 531 243 288 0.458 
2013 505 237 268 0.469 
Total 8,497 4,215 4,282 0.496 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Variable N Mean 25th % Median 75th % Std Dev 
CPA 8,497 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
MBA 8,497 0.382 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.486 
FIN 8,497 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.301 
PriorCFO 8,497 0.336 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.472 
Prop Public US Exp 6,913 0.335 0.000 0.204 0.639 0.369 
BoardSeat  8,497 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.364 
ExtHire 8,497 0.598 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.490 
Age 6,719 47.686 43.000 48.000 53.000 6.997 
Tenure 5,247 4.063 2.359 3.490 5.208 2.202 
CEOt,t+5 8,497 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 
IndComplexityt-3,t-1 8,497 1.885 0.847 1.792 2.909 1.390 
|Accrualst-1| 7,685 0.113 0.027 0.059 0.121 0.177 
ICWt-1 8,497 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.213 
GeoSegt-1 8,497 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.099 0.656 
Distresst-1 8,104 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.277 
Investmentt-1 7,810 0.196 0.019 0.059 0.169 0.435 
AnalystFollowt-1 8,497 1.017 0.000 0.000 2.197 1.199 
MAt-1 8,497 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.458 
IndMAt-1 8,497 3.718 2.890 3.871 4.812 1.470 
GrossMargint-1 7,926 0.103 0.212 0.380 0.581 1.991 
IndGrossMargint-1 8,497 0.397 0.277 0.393 0.514 0.154 
Acctgt-1 8,497 0.388 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.487 
CEOCPAt-1 8,497 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.243 
COOt-1 8,497 0.515 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 
ROAt-1 8,096 -0.023 -0.016 0.041 0.098 0.286 
BMt-1 8,232 0.561 0.123 0.422 0.774 0.629 
Levt-1 8,130 0.232 0.021 0.173 0.359 0.237 




Table 2, Continued. Panel B: Descriptive statistics by CFO type   
 CPA Non-CPA Mean 
Difference 
 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median p-value 
MBA 4,215 0.289 0.000 4,282 0.473 0.000 -0.184*** 0.000 
FIN 4,215 0.044 0.000 4,282 0.157 0.000 -0.114*** 0.000 
PriorCFO 4,215 0.350 0.000 4,282 0.322 0.000 0.028*** 0.007 
Prop Public US Exp 3,471 0.306 0.000 3,442 0.365 0.000 -0.058*** 0.000 
BoardSeat  4,215 0.134 0.000 4,282 0.180 0.000 -0.047*** 0.000 
ExtHire 4,215 0.606 0.000 4,282 0.590 0.000 0.016 0.138 
Age 3,369 47.272 42.000 3,350 48.103 43.000 -0.831*** 0.000 
Tenure 2,573 3.981 2.307 2,674 4.142 2.411 -0.160*** 0.008
CEOt,t+5 4,215 0.033 0.000 4,282 0.041 0.000 -0.008* 0.062 
IndComplexityt-3,t-1 4,215 1.945 0.981 4,282 1.827 0.847 0.118*** 0.000 
|Accrualst-1| 3,824 0.116 0.027 3,861 0.110 0.026 0.006 0.147 
ICWt-1 4,215 0.054 0.000 4,282 0.042 0.000 0.012*** 0.009 
GeoSegt-1 4,215 0.444 0.000 4,282 0.508 0.000 -0.064*** 0.000 
Distresst-1 4,023 0.075 0.000 4,081 0.093 0.000 -0.019*** 0.002
Investmentt-1 3,881 0.191 0.017 3,929 0.201 0.020 -0.009 0.349 
AnalystFollowt-1 4,215 0.925 0.000 4,282 1.108 0.000 -0.182*** 0.000 
MAt-1 4,215 0.216 0.000 4,282 0.249 0.000 -0.033*** 0.001 
IndMAt-1 4,215 3.749 2.944 4,282 3.689 2.890 0.060* 0.061 
GrossMargint-1 3,936 0.084 0.213 3,990 0.121 0.212 -0.037 0.409 
IndGrossMargint-1 4,215 0.399 0.284 4,282 0.394 0.274 0.005 0.176 
Acctgt-1 4,215 0.338 0.000 4,282 0.437 0.000 -0.098*** 0.000 
CEOCPAt-1 4,215 0.070 0.000 4,282 0.056 0.000 0.014*** 0.007 
COOt-1 4,215 0.518 0.000 4,282 0.512 0.000 0.006 0.565 
ROAt-1 4,020 -0.026 -0.023 4,076 -0.019 -0.009 -0.007 0.290 
BMt-1 4,086 0.567 0.136 4,146 0.555 0.111 0.013 0.361
Levt-1 4,035 0.225 0.013 4,095 0.239 0.029 -0.015*** 0.005 
Ln(MVE t-1) 3,477 5.678 4.327 3,484 6.263 4.744 -0.585*** 0.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and separately for CPA and non-CPA hires. See Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance 
of the mean values between the CPA- and non-CPA CFO hires at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




US Exp BoardSeat  ExtHire Age 
(2) MBA -0.189        
 (0.000)        
(3) FIN -0.189 0.136       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
(4) Prior CFO 0.029 0.100 -0.028      
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.011)      
(5) Prop Public US Exp -0.083 0.146 0.003 0.352     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.787) (0.000)     
(6) BoardSeat  -0.064 0.051 0.064 0.104 0.037    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)    
(7) ExtHire 0.015 0.117 0.048 0.335 0.104 0.046   
 (0.156) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
(8) Age -0.059 0.076 -0.097 0.257 0.091 0.120 0.157 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients between variables representing characteristics of the CFOs hired in our sample over the period 2000-2013. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. p-values are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Determinants of hiring a CPA CFO 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) 
        
SOXt 0.155***   0.132** 0.136** 0.136** 
(2.93)   (2.44) (2.50) (2.26) 
IndComplexityt-3,t-1 0.052***   0.076*** 0.079*** 0.090*** 
(3.09)   (2.96) (3.06) (3.14) 
|Accrualst-1| 0.147   0.222 0.168 0.184 
(1.13)   (1.51) (1.14) (0.97) 
ICWt-1 0.213**   0.199* 0.219** 0.158 
 (2.06)   (1.88) (2.05) (1.46) 
MAt-1   -0.082 -0.065 -0.047 0.010 
   (-1.62) (-1.24) (-0.90) (0.18) 
IndMAt-1   0.027 -0.010 -0.019 -0.024 
   (1.55) (-0.46) (-0.86) (-0.95) 
GrossMargin t-1   -0.029* -0.031* -0.032* -0.040** 
  (-1.71) (-1.80) (-1.85) (-2.01) 
IndGrossMargint-1   0.013 -0.139 -0.203 -0.435** 
   (0.08) (-0.77) (-1.12) (-2.17) 
GeoSegt-1   -0.104*** -0.119*** -0.100*** -0.081** 
   (-2.95) (-3.32) (-2.79) (-2.08) 
Distresst-1   -0.383*** -0.425*** -0.419*** -0.614*** 
   (-4.39) (-4.73) (-4.65) (-4.11) 
Investmentt-1   -0.188** -0.241*** -0.245*** -0.248** 
   (-2.45) (-3.07) (-3.09) (-2.51) 
AnalystFollowt-1   -0.135*** -0.133*** -0.105*** -0.015 
   (-6.68) (-6.46) (-4.95) (-0.54) 
Acctgt-1       -0.383*** -0.271*** 
       (-7.74) (-4.93) 
CEOCPAt-1       0.305*** 0.310*** 
       (3.19) (3.03) 
COOt-1       0.072 0.103** 
      (1.52) (1.99) 
ROAt-1         0.226 
         (1.52) 
BMt-1         -0.154*** 
         (-3.43) 
Levt-1         -0.079 
         (-0.62) 
Ln(MVEt-1)         -0.140*** 
         (-7.33) 
Constant -0.174*** 0.174** 0.188** 0.300*** 1.171*** 
 (-4.16) (2.20) (2.17) (3.18) (7.62) 
           
Observations 7,685 7,810 7,519 7,519 6,483 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.019 0.028 
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Table 4, continued. 
Panel B: Marginal effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) Pr(CPA=1) 
        
SOXt 0.038***   0.032** 0.033** 0.033** 
(2.93)   (2.45) (2.50) (2.27) 
IndComplexityt-3,t-1 0.013***   0.019*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 
(3.10)   (2.97) (3.07) (3.15) 
|Accrualst-1| 0.037   0.055 0.041 0.044 
(1.13)   (1.51) (1.14) (0.97) 
ICWt-1 0.053**   0.049* 0.053** 0.038 
 (2.06)   (1.88) (2.06) (1.46) 
MAt-1   -0.020 -0.016 -0.011 0.002 
   (-1.62) (-1.24) (-0.90) (0.18) 
IndMAt-1   0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
   (1.55) (-0.46) (-0.86) (-0.95) 
GrossMargint-1   -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* -0.010** 
  (-1.71) (-1.80) (-1.85) (-2.01) 
IndGrossMargint-1   0.003 -0.034 -0.049 -0.105** 
   (0.08) (-0.77) (-1.12) (-2.17) 
GeoSegt-1   -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.020** 
   (-2.96) (-3.33) (-2.79) (-2.08) 
Distresst-1   -0.095*** -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.148*** 
   (-4.42) (-4.76) (-4.68) (-4.13) 
Investment t-1   -0.046** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.060** 
   (-2.45) (-3.08) (-3.09) (-2.52) 
AnalystFollowt-1   -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.004 
   (-6.75) (-6.53) (-4.98) (-0.54) 
Acctgt-1       -0.093*** -0.065*** 
       (-7.86) (-4.96) 
CEOCPAt-1       0.074*** 0.075*** 
       (3.20) (3.04) 
COOt-1       0.018 0.025** 
      (1.52) (1.99) 
ROAt-1         0.054 
         (1.52) 
BMt-1         -0.037*** 
         (-3.44) 
Levt-1         -0.019 
         (-0.62) 
Ln(MVEt-1)         -0.034*** 
         (-7.45) 
      
Observations 7,685 7,810 7,519 7,519 6,483 
This table presents estimates from a logistic regression of the determinants of hiring a CFO with a CPA 
qualification. The dependent variable equals one if the CFO hired has a CPA and zero otherwise. Panel A 
presents the coefficient estimates and Panel B presents the marginal effects. See Appendix A for other variable 
definitions. z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Turnover analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 










          
PoorFitt+n 0.209*** 0.144** 0.186** 0.168** 
(2.97) (2.06) (2.34) (2.19) 
Rett+n -0.306*** -0.183*** -0.285*** -0.148** 
(-4.34) (-2.64) (-3.93) (-2.13) 
BoardSeatt 0.224*** 0.162* 0.180** 0.142 
(2.87) (1.80) (2.20) (1.54) 
CEOTenuret -0.018*** -0.011* -0.021*** -0.015** 
(-2.69) (-1.69) (-3.07) (-2.22) 
Aget+n 0.016*** 0.002 0.020*** 0.007 
(3.55) (0.35) (4.20) (1.44) 
PriorCFOt 0.194*** 0.117* 0.195*** 0.093 
(2.97) (1.76) (2.85) (1.34) 
Ln(MVEt+n) -0.078*** -0.100*** -0.123*** -0.101*** 
(-4.60) (-5.47) (-4.96) (-3.88) 
Levt+n 0.146 0.125 0.224 0.198 
(0.99) (0.86) (1.23) (1.14) 
BMt+n -0.053 0.001 -0.048 0.046 
(-0.97) (0.02) (-0.76) (0.77) 
ROAt+n -0.611*** -0.547*** -0.847*** -0.844*** 
(-3.78) (-3.60) (-3.81) (-4.01) 
Constant -3.405*** -3.957*** -2.233 -3.355** 
(-2.60) (-2.61) (-1.64) (-2.18) 
Remaining determinants controls No No Yes Yes 
CFO tenure fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,127 10,372 10,127 10,372 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.049 0.084 0.089 
This table presents estimates from a logistic regression of the determinants of CFO turnover. The dependent 
variable equals one if the CFO turns over during the following year (t + n + 1). See Appendix A for other 
variable definitions. Columns (1) and (3) present results for non-CPA CFOs; Columns (2) and (4) present results 
for CPA CFOs. Industry fixed effects are defined using two-digit SIC codes. Robust z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
45 
Table 6: Executive team expansion 
 
Panel A: Change in the existence of a COO position 
 



















Total 511 541 1,052 
 
߯ଶ ൌ 3.071; ݌ െ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ൌ 0.080  
 
 
Panel B: Change in the existence of an accounting related position 
 
 



















Total 457 379 836 
 
߯ଶ ൌ 10.617; ݌ െ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ൌ 0.001  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
This table presents two-way contingency tables for the subsample of CFO hires for which we have data on the 
prior CFO employed at the firm. Panel A sorts observations based on whether firms change the operational 
expertise of the top management team by either adding a COO position (AddCOO) or dropping a COO position 
(DropCOO) following an increase in the accounting expertise of the CFO (AddCPA) or decrease in the 
accounting expertise of the CFO (DropCPA). Panel B sorts observations based on whether firms either add or 
drop an accounting related position on the top management team (AddAcctg or DropAcctg) when the firm 
increases or decreases the extent of accounting expertise of the CFO (AddCPA or DropCPA). See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. Each cell reports total observations that fall in that cell along with the percentage of 
each row total that cell comprises (shown in brackets). We also report Pearson's Chi-squared for the hypothesis 
that the rows and columns in each table are independent. 
 46 
 
Table 7: Likelihood of becoming the future CEO 
 
  (1) 
Pr(CEOt,t+5=1) 
VARIABLES Coefficient  Marginal effects 
    
CPA -0.254* -0.011* 
  (-1.79) (-1.79) 
PriorCFO 0.277* 0.012* 
  (1.86) (1.85) 
Aget -0.017 -0.001 
  (-1.57) (-1.56) 
Constant -2.272***   
  (-4.41)   
  
Observations 4,993 
Pseudo R2 0.004 
This table presents estimates from a logistic regression model estimating the likelihood of career progression 
into the CEO position. See Appendix A for a list of variables used in the analysis. Robust z-statistics in 




Table 8: Cross-sectional variation in predictive ability of hiring model 
Panel A: Including all variables from hiring model 
 N Pseudo R2  
OpChanget+1 = 0  4,950 0.031  
OpChanget+1 = 1 1,506 0.022  
Difference  0.009** p-value = 0.030 
    
RetShockt-1 = 0 4,044 0.034  
RetShockt-1 = 1 2,105 0.026  
Difference  0.008* p-value = 0.074 
    
RetVolt-1 = 0 3,070 0.035  
RetVolt-1 = 1 3,413 0.026  
Difference  0.008* p-value = 0.098 
    
ExtHire = 0  3,854 0.038  
ExtHire = 1 2,279 0.029  
Difference  0.009* p-value = 0.080 
 
Panel B: Excluding control variables 
 N Pseudo R2  
OpChanget+1 = 0 5,818 0.021  
OpChanget+1 = 1 1,663 0.016  
Difference  0.005* p-value = 0.075 
    
RetShockt-1 = 0 4,081 0.026  
RetShockt-1 = 1 2,123 0.017  
Difference  0.009** p-value = 0.050 
    
RetVolt-1 = 0 3,184 0.027  
RetVolt-1 = 1 4,335 0.019  
Difference  0.008* p-value = 0.059 
    
ExtHire = 0  3,883 0.030  
ExtHire = 1 2,300 0.017  
Difference  0.013*** p-value = 0.009 
This table presents the Pseudo R2 from estimating Equation (1) separately on various subsamples. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions and Appendix B for a description of the procedure used to calculate the significance of 
the differences in the Pseudo R2s. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
